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Abstract—The heterogeneous networks belonging to different service providers (SPs) form a 
coalition system for maximizing the profit, where they may either compete or cooperate with each 
other. In this paper, we introduce Lokta-Volterra model, a differntial dynamics model, to build the 
competitive and cooperative mechanisms of heterogeneous networks. It considers the natural 
growth rate of the network itself and competitive and cooperative effects among networks. Then, 
according to ordinary differential principle, the stability of the proposed model and its equilibrium 
points are analyzed. And system performances are evaluated by Vensim which is used for 
developing, analyzing, and packaging dynamic feedback models. Analysis and simulation results 
show that the natural growth rate of the network cannot increase its profit but effective cooperative 
mechanism among heterogeneous networks can increase the profit of each network.  
Index Terms—Heterogeneous networks, cooperative and competitive, spectrum sharing, 
Lokta-Volterra model. 
I.Introduction 
With the development of wireless communication technology, a variety heterogeneous  
communication technologies provide the users with ubiquitous access to the data networks. In 
heterogeneous wireless networks, user terminal with multi-network interface is capable of 
accessing different networks and choose the network with the most suitable quality of service 
(QoS) with the least service costs. In such an environment, all the service providers (SPs) compete 
to maximize their revenue by attracting more users. As a result, severe competition may result in 
lower product prices and may shrink total profits of SPs in turn, which may not be desirable for 
SPs. In that case, SPs may opt to cooperate instead of competition. To this end, the cooperation 
among heterogeneous networks has become an important research topic [1]-[7]. 
Cooperation among wireless SPs, whereby different SPs form a coalition and share their 
resources, such as spectrum and base station (or access points) and relay nodes, and serve each 
other other’s customers, has the potential to substantially improve the utilization of the available 
resources. There are a number of recent publications that address cooperation among 
heterogeneous networks [1]-[7].  
In [1], a novel interrelated market model for hierarchical spectrum sharing among primary, 
secondary, tertiary, and quaternary services is proposed. In [2], the authors propose a simple 
QoS-based dynamic pricing approach for services provisioning in order to maximize the revenue 
of SPs and increase user satisfaction level by applying dynamic pricing strategies based on the 
QoS. In [3], the author investigates heterogeneous network architectures to estimate the pricing for 
wireless data services. In [4], S. H. Chun etc. study the problem of designing a secondary 
spectrum-trading market with multiple sellers and multiple buyers and propose a general 
framework for the trading market based on an auction mechanism. In [5], D. Niyato etc. 
investigate three different pricing models, namely, market-equilibrium, competitive, and 
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cooperative pricing models for spectrum trading in a cognitive radio environment. In [6], H. 
Chang etc. propose a cooperative spectrum sharing scheme for heterogeneous wireless networks 
by using a market model, where the equilibrium at which all SPs and all licensed users satisfy the 
amount of the allocated bandwidth and the price simultaneously is obtained by using the concept 
of demand and supply from economics. In [7], C.Singh etc. investigate cooperation among 
providers in wireless networks. The cooperation is modeled by using the theory of transferable 
payoff coalitional games.  
From [1]-[7], It is seen that the heterogeneous networks form a coalition system for maximizing 
the profit, where they may cooperate and compete. In one hand, it is beneficial for all SPs to 
cooperatively share spectrum where each SP shares its extra spectrum with other SPs’ licensed 
users to increase the overall network capacity and QoS of the heterogeneous networks. On the 
other hand, the SPs compete with each other by setting access service prices for attracting more 
users for more profit. Therefore, in the coalition system, the profit maximization problem becomes 
more complex due to their interactions. Specifically, the price and QoS strategies of a wireless SP 
will determine how many customers it can entice (in competition with other SPs) to enhance its 
profit. Pricing strategy is one of the important factors a SP should consider to maximize its profit. 
There exists a trade-off between the price and profit: a lower price attracts more customer arrivals 
while less revenue per customer is achieved; a higher price limits customer arrivals but yields 
higher per-customer revenue. The user QoS satisfaction also affects the wireless SP’s profit, which 
is described in terms of several factors, such as the probability of blocking and dropping and QoS 
degradation. Better user QoS enticing more customers can be achieved by occupying more 
channels, which in turn incurs higher channel leasing cost. Hence, a wireless SP should strike a 
balance between its tariff and QoS provisioning since better QoS can be achieved by leasing more 
channels, which in turn incurs higher channel leasing cost.  
It is seen that when user requirements (such as the price and QoS) arise, resources of 
heterogeneous networks related to user requirements are organized. Combination of resources of 
different networks may lead to many kinds of cooperation modes, while different cooperation 
modes may result in resource reallocation between networks. Therefore, the user requirements are 
only the superficies and actually the whole complex coalition system is controlled by the resource 
allocation modes. Since user requirements vary with time, it is necessary to optimize resource 
allocation to achieve dynamic balance of each network. Actually, resource optimization process is 
dynamic evolvement of resource usage from unblance to balance and then from one balance to 
another balance. Therefore, it is very important for a network to choose adaptive cooperative 
partners and mechanism to make up for insufficiency of itself limited resource. Therefore, 
heterogeneous networks can be constructed in a self-organization of structure and reach a certain 
orderly state. 
In this paper we propose to use the basic idea and research results in the field of differential 
dynamic model [8] to design a general and effective "network cooperation framework" among 
wireless heterogeneous networks to coordinate the interbehaviors between user and network, 
network and network, user and user, and also to guide users’ consumptions. First, from the point of 
view of system dynamics, mathematical model is made to study the network resource allocation 
problem and cooperative and competitive mechanism of heterogeneous networks. Then, structure 
of the proposed model and its stability are analyzed. And finally system performances are 
evaluated. Our problem formulation, solution techniques, and results significantly differ from the 
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existing literatures. Our focus is on cooperative resource allocation in macroscopic behavior 
among wireless networks.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. Section III 
presents the structure of the cooperative and competitive model and stability analysis. Section IV 
presents the performance evaluation. Finally, Section V gives the conclusions. 
II. System Model 
We consider a heterogeneous networking scenario, which consists of N (N≥2) wireless networks 
(WNs) belonging to different SPs. As shown in Fig. 1, the SPs form a coalition system for 
maximizing the profit where they may either compete or cooperate with each other. In the 
coalition system, the cooperation may include inner-cooperation among users or base stations (or 
APs) in each network and inter-cooperation between networks. Here our focus is on cooperative 
resource allocation in macroscopic behavior among wireless networks. Through the cooperation of 
networks new cooperative effects of the coalition system are produced. Often these effects cannot 
be even formulated by means of the network alone. 
In this paper, the operation state, denoted by q, of the coalition system is measured by the 
network profit. It can be decided by many factors including service tariff, customer satisfaction 
and QoS provisioning, and coexistence among networks. According to the synergetics theory 
[9]-[11], although many variables may affect the operation of the coalition system, actually only 
one or a few variables called order parameters slave the subsystems on the microscopic level. 
Hence, the proper selection of order parameters appears to be a central issue to model the 
operation of coalition system. It is found in the presence of collocated SPs, the profit 
maximization problem becomes more complex due to their interactions. Specifically, the price and 
QoS strategies of a network drive the customers to choose their service network. Hence, each 
network will provide reasonable price and guarantee QoS to entice the customers to enhance its 
profit. As a result, the price and QoS strategies of a network will determine the number of 
customers choosing different networks, i.e. inducing resource reallocation among networks. 
Therefore, according to the synergetics theory, we believe the resource allocation mode among the 
networks is the order parameter determining the macroscopic pattern of the coalition system.  
We first assume there is only network i providing the service. And we let qi(t) denote network 
i’s profit at time t, 
' ( )iq t denote profit increasing rate and fi(qi) denote its instant increment rate 
(i.e. 
' ( ) / ( )i iq t q t ). Also we assume the maximum profit of network i, denoted by Vi. According to 
[8], when iV  , the network profit will increase with exponent function with fixed instant 
increment rate fi(qi), i.e. 
' ( ) . ( )i iq t r q t , where r denotes the profit increment rate in this 
condition. Actually, iV is always limited. We define ( ) /i iq t V denoting the profit density. It is 
easily known the profit increase will become slower and slower with the increase of ( ) /i iq t V . 
When ( )i iq t V , it creases increasing. Here, we use . ( ) /i ir q t V to express the varying factor. 
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Therefore, the profit evolvement of network i can be expressed by 
' ( )( ) . ( )[ ] ( )i ii i i i
i
V q t
q t r q t q f q
V

             (1) 
where
( ) ( )
1i i i
i i
V q t q t
V V

  denotes trapping (accelerating) effect of the profit increase induced 
by the increase (decrease) of the profit density. By the first-order conditions, we obtain its 
equilibrium point as ( )i iq t V . 
However, when different networks form a coalition system, they may either compete or 
cooperate with each other. Hence, fi(qi) is not the only function of qi and it is necessarily related to 
the state variables of other networks. Therefore, fi(qi) should be rewritten as fi(Q), where Q=( q1, 
q2,…, qn)
T
. Hence, (1) changes into 
( ) ( )i i i
dq
q t f Q
dt
               (2) 
Cooperation and competition are the inherent attributes of the coalition system. And the 
interaction between them drives the self-organization evolvement of the system and their 
interaction degree decides the order and stability of the system. Therefore, we introduce two 
parameters, ( 1 1)ij ij    and ( 1 1)ij ij    , to indicate the competitive and cooperative 
effect between WNi and WNj induced by resource allocation mode among the networks. Since 
WNi and WNj share some common resources, such as spectrum and users, competition for 
resources occurs between them. Therefore, ij denotes the competitive effect of WNj taking on 
WNi. For example, when they completely share common resources, 1ij  , i.e., WNj takes a large 
competitive effect on WNi, and when they share no common resources, we let 0ij  , i.e., WNj 
takes no competitive effect on WNi. And we let ij denote the cooperative effect of WNj taking on 
WNi. Similarly, 1ij  denotes a large cooperative effect of WNj taking on WNi and 
0ij  indicates no cooperative effect of WNj taking on WNi. If we assume fi(qi) is a linear 
function, then Lokta-Volterra model [12], a differential dynamics model, can be used to model the 
profit evolvement of network i. Therefore, the profit evolvement of the competitive and 
cooperative networks can be adapted from (2) as  
(1 )
ij j ij ji i
i i
j i j ii j j
q qdq q
rq
dt V V V
 
 
              (3) 
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Therefore, the competitive and cooperative mechanism of heterogeneous networks can be 
modeled by (3). Next we shall see how the interactions of heterogeneous networks give rise to 
stable structure. 
coalition system
network 1 network 2 network n
User terminals
cooperative effect
compete
cooperate
 
Fig. 1 Coalition system is composed of heterogeneous networks. 
 
III. Structure of the Cooperative and Competitive Model and Stability Analysis 
In this section, for the sake of clarity of the discussions, we consider two WNs (WN1 and WN2). 
However, the concepts can be easily extended to an arbitrary number of WNs. Then, according to 
(3), the cooperative and competitive model of two networks can be expressed as follows: 
1 1 2 2
1 1 12 12 1 1 1 2
1 2 2
2 2 1 1
2 2 21 21 2 2 1 2
2 1 1
(1 ) ( , )
(1 ) ( , )
dq q q q
r q q f q q
dt V V V
dq q q q
r q q f q q
dt V V V
 
 

    


     

          (4) 
According to the systematic eliminating procedure, the equilibrium points of equation (4) can be 
obtained by solving 
1 2 2
1 1 12 12
1 2 2
2 1 1
2 2 21 21
2 1 1
(1 ) 0
(1 ) 0
q q q
r q
V V V
q q q
r q
V V V
 
 

   


    

              (5) 
Hence, four equilibrium points are obtained: 1(0,0)P , 2 1( ,0)P V , 3 2(0, )P V and 
12 12 1 21 21 2
4
12 12 21 21 12 12 21 21
[1 ( )] [1 ( )]
( , )
1 ( )( ) 1 ( )( )
V V
P
   
       
   
     
. 
For any equilibrium point, the corresponding characteristic matrix of evolution equation (5) can be 
obtained by  
1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
q q q q
q q q q
 
 
    
      
A ,            (6) 
as 
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1 2 2 1 1
1 12 12 1 12 12
1 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 1
2 21 21 2 21 21
1 1 2 1 1
(1 2 ) ( )
( ) (1 2 )
q q q q q
r r
V V V V V l m
q q q q q n o
r r
V V V V V
   
   
 
    
 
    
       
 
A . 
Then, the characteristic equation of matrix A is  
2 0b c    ,                 (7) 
where ( )b l o   and c lo mn  . And, its eigenvalues are 
2 2
1 2
4 4
,
2 2
b b c b b c
 
     
  . 
According to ordinary differential principle, the stability of equilibrium points can be judged by 
the plus or minus sign of b, c, b
2
-4c, or the plus or minus sign of λ1 and λ2. Here, we take the 
former method to judge, i.e., if c<0, the equilibrium point is a saddle point; if b>0, c>0 and 
b
2
-4c >0, the equilibrium point is a stable point; if b<0, c>0 and b
2
-4c >0, the equilibrium point is 
an unstable point.  
Next, we will analyze the stability of competitive and cooperative model. 
① Input 1(0,0)P  into A, then A becomes 
1
1
2
0
0
r
r
 
  
 
A .              (8) 
Then, 1 2( ) 0b r r    , 1 2 0c rr  and
2 2
1 24 ( ) 0b c r r    . Therefore, 1(0,0)P is an 
unstable point. This shows that when the profit of each WN equals to zero, the system is unstable 
and this case does not exist. 
② Input 2 1( ,0)P V  into A, then A becomes 
1
1 1 12 12
22
2 21 21
( )
0 (1 )
V
r r
V
r
 
 
 
  
 
   
A  .         (9) 
Then, 1 2 21 21(1 )b r r      and 1 2 21 21(1 )c rr      . If 21 211 0    , then, c<0. 
Therefore, 2 1( ,0)P V is a saddle point. If 21 211 0    , then c>0, b>0 and b
2
-4c >0. Therefore, 
2 1( ,0)P V is a stable point. Since 21 211 0    , we can 
obtain 21 21 21 210, 0,and simultaneouly 1        , which indicates that the competitive 
negative effect of WN1 taking on WN2 is larger than the cooperative positive effect of WN1 taking 
on WN2. From the profit of two networks, (V1,0), we can see that excessive competition of two 
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networks makes no increase of profit for WN1 while the profit of WN2 is 0.  
③Input 3 2(0, )P V  into A, then A becomes 
1 12 12
3 2 2
2 21 21 2
1 1
(1 ) 0
( )
r
V V
r r
V V
 
 
  
 
  
  
A  .         (10) 
Then, 2 1 12 12(1 )b r r      and 1 2 12 12(1 )c rr      . If 12 121 0    , then c<0. 
Therefore, 3 2(0, )P V is a saddle point. If 12 121 0    , then c>0, b>0 and b
2
-4c>0. Therefore, 
3 2(0, )P V is a stable point. Similar to the analysis on 2 1( ,0)P V , since 12 121 0    , we can 
obtain 12 12 12 120, 0,and simultaneouly 1        , which indicates that the 
competitive effect of WN2 taking on WN1 is more than the cooperative effect of WN2 taking on 
WN1. From the profit of two SPs, (0,V2), we can see that excessive competition of two SPs makes 
no increase of profit of WN2 while the profit of WN1 is 0. 
④Input 12 12 1 21 21 24
12 12 21 21 12 12 21 21
[1 ( )] [1 ( )]
( , )
1 ( )( ) 1 ( )( )
V V
P
   
       
   
     
 into A, then A becomes 
4
E F
G H
 
  
 
A , 
where 1 12 12
12 12 21 21
(1 )
1 ( )( )
r
E
 
   
  

  
, 1 1 12 12 12 12
2 12 12 21 21
( )[1 ( )]
1 ( )( )
rV
F
V
   
   
  
 
  
, 
2 2 21 21 21 21
1 12 12 21 21
( )[1 ( )]
1 ( )( )
r V
G
V
   
   
  
 
  
, and 2 21 21
12 12 21 21
(1 )
1 ( )( )
r
H
 
   
  

  
. 
Then, we obtain 1 12 12 2 21 21
12 12 21 21
(1 ) (1 )
1 ( )( )
r r
b
   
   
    

  
， 1 2 12 12 21 21
12 12 21 21
[1 )(1 )
1 ( )( )
r r
c
   
   
   

  
. 
and 
2 21 12 12 2 21 21
12 12 21 21
(1 ) (1 )
4 [ ] 0
1 ( )( )
r r
b c
   
   
    
  
  
. 
In this case, in order to judge the plus or minus sign of b, c, b
2
-4c, the following four conditions 
need to be discussed. 
(i) When 12 121 0    and 21 211 0    , then 12 12 21 211 ( )( ) 0        . Thus in 
this way, c>0, b>0 and b
2
-4c>0. Therefore, P4 is a stable point. That is to say, the coalition system 
is in stable state when 0ij  , or 0ij  , and or 0ij  , 0ij  and simultaneously 
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1ij ij    . This shows that the conditions that the coalition system is stable are that the 
cooperative effect on the partner network is bigger than the competitive effect on the partner 
network or the competitive effect is so small that it cannot induce the coalition system fluctuation. 
In this case, the profit of two networks is respectively given by  
12 12 1
1
12 12 21 21
[1 ( )]
1 ( )( )
V
q
 
   
 

  
 
and 
21 21 2
2
12 12 21 21
[1 ( )]
1 ( )( )
V
q
 
   
 

  
 
Since, 
1 1q V and 2 2q V , then 1 2 1 2q q V V   .  
Therefore, under the stable state of P4, the profit produced by the two networks with 
cooperation is bigger than that of the two networks without cooperation.  
(ii) When 12 121 0    and 21 211 0    , if 12 12 21 21[1 ( )( )] 0       , then b<0. 
Therefore, P4 is a saddle point. It shows the competitive effect of the coalition system is larger 
than the cooperative effect. In this case the coalition system is unstable. 
If 12 12 21 21[1 ( )( )] 0       and 1 12 12 2 21 21(1 ) (1 )r r          , then b>0and a>0. It 
is still a stable point. It shows that the competitive negative effect of WN1 taking on WN2 is larger 
than the cooperative positive effect of WN1 taking on WN2while the effect of WN1 taking on WN2 
is bigger. But when 1 12 12 2 21 21(1 ) (1 )r r         , a<0. Therefore, it is unstable. It shows 
the excessive competition will disintegrate the system. 
When 12 121 0    and 21 211 0    , analysis are similar. 
 (iii) When 12 121 0    and 21 211 0    , then 12 12 21 211 ( )( ) 0       . Hence, 
b<0. Therefore, it is a saddle point. It shows the excessive competition will make the system 
unstable and finally disintegrate the system. 
IV. Performance Evaluation 
We evaluate the performance of our proposed model by Vensim [12] which is used for developing, 
analyzing, and packaging dynamic feedback models. We consider a coalition system consisting of 
WN1 and WN2. The program by DYNAMO language for the cooperative and competitive model of 
WN1 and WN2 is shown in Fig. 2. According to the program, the corresponding system dynamics 
model is shown in Fig. 3. 
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L   q1.K = q1.J + DT (IR1.JK - OR1.JK)
R   IR1.KL = R11.K + R12.K
A   R11.K = r1* q1.K
A   R12.K = d12* r1* q1.K * q2.K V2
R   OR1.KL = R13.K + R14.K
A   R13.K = r1* q1.K * q1.K V1
A   R14.K = b12* r1* q1.K * q2.K V2
L   q2.K = q2

.J + DT (IR2.JK - OR2.JK)
R   IR2.KL = R21.K + R22.K
A   R21.K = r2 * q2.K
A   R22.K = d21* r2* q1.K * q2.K V1
R   OR2.KL = R23.K + R24.K
A   R23.K = r2* q2.K * q2.K V2
A   R24.K = b21* r2* q1.K * q2.K V1

 
Fig. 2 Program by DYNAMO language for the cooperative and competitive model of WN1 and WN2 
q1
IR1 OR1
q2
IR2 OR2
R11 R12 R13 R14
R21 R22
R23
R24
δ12
δ21
β12
β21
r1
r2
V2
V1
 
Fig. 3 System dynamics model of two networks with cooperation and competition 
In this set of experiments, we assume the maximum profits of WN1 and WN2 are 150 and 100 
respectively in non-cooperative scheme where each SP serves its LUs with all of its bandwidth 
respectively, i.e., V1=150 and V2=100. Fig. 4 shows the profit evolving curves with time for WN1 
and WN2 with different natural growth rates (i.e., r1 and r2) under the conditions of 
non-cooperation and non-competition, i.e., 12 12 21 21 0       . We observe that the large 
natural growth rate cannot increase the profit of the network but can make the network use less 
time to achieve the equilibrium point, i.e. (150,100).  
Fig. 5 shows the profit evolving curves for WN1 and WN2 with time, where V1=150, V2=100, 
r1=r2=0.01, 12 0.5  , 21 0.6  , 12 0.3  , 21 0.4  . We compare the profit of each SP in 
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cooperative spectrum sharing scheme (denoted by CWN1 and CWN2) with the maximum profit of 
each SP in non-cooperative scheme (denoted by WN1 and WN2). It is seen from the figure that 
when the cooperative coefficient is larger than the competitive coefficient, the system can reach 
equilibrium point (187.49, 125.00) and it is also a stable equilibrium point. In this case, the 
increased percentages of each SP’s profit by this cooperative spectrum sharing scheme are 24.99% 
and 25% respectively. Therefore, all SPs gain extra incentives. It is also seen that only if the 
heterogeneous system evolves with cooperation, can the coalition system reach the stable state 
with time going on. 
Fig. 6 shows the profit evolving curves for WN1 and WN2 when the cooperative coefficient is 
less than the competitive coefficient. It is seen that in this case each SP’s profit will decrease. 
Therefore, the excessive competition will decrease each SP’s profit and make the system unstable.  
Fig.7 shows the profit evolving curves for WN1 and WN2 with time, where V1=V2=100, 
r1=r2=0.05, 12 0.1  , 21 0.1  , 12 0.8  , 21 0.7  . In this set of experiments, the two 
networks have the same network scale and natural growth rate, but the cooperative coefficient is 
less than the competitive coefficient. It is also seen from the figure that with time going on, the 
profit of one network will decrease and the profit of the other network will increase. As a result, 
the coalition system will not be stable and finally disintegrated. Therefore, severe competition 
may result in lower price and may shrink total profit of SPs in turn. As an extreme result, one SP 
cannot increase the profit due to lower price although it can attract all the users, and the other SP 
has no users and so there is no profit at all.   
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Fig. 4 Profit evolving curves with time, where V1=150, V2=100, and 12 12 21 21 0       . 
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Fig. 5 Profit evolving curves with time, where V1=150, V2=100, r1=r2=0.01, 12 0.5  , 
21 0.6  , 12 0.3  , 21 0.4  . 
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Fig. 6 Profit evolving curves with time, where V1=150, V2=100, r1=r2=0.05, 12 0.1  , 
21 0.2  , 12 0.5  , 21 0.9  . 
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Fig. 7 Profit evolving curves with time, where V1=V2=100, r1=r2=0.05, 12 0.1  , 
21 0.1  , 12 0.8  , 21 0.7  . 
 
V. Conclusions 
The heterogeneous networks form a coalition system for maximizing the profit, where they 
may either compete or cooperate with each other. In this paper, we introduce Lokta-Volterra model, 
to build SPs’ profit evolvement model which considers natural growth rate of the network itself 
and cooperative and competitive effects among networks. Then, structure of the proposed 
cooperative and competitive model and its stability analysis are given. And system performances 
are evaluated by Vensim. Analysis and simulation results show that the stability of the coalition 
system depends on the cooperative mechanism of its subsystems. When the coalition system 
approaches the evolving stable state, the profit of each SP in cooperative scheme is larger than that 
of each SP in non-cooperative scheme. Therefore, the cooperation of the coalition system 
optimizes the system architecture and increases the total profit. 
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